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Abstract—Deep learning models achieve impressive perfor-
mance for skeleton-based human action recognition. However,
the robustness of these models to adversarial attacks remains
largely unexplored due to their complex spatio-temporal nature
that must represent sparse and discrete skeleton joints. This work
presents the first adversarial attack on skeleton-based action
recognition with graph convolutional networks. The proposed
targeted attack, termed Constrained Iterative Attack for Skeleton
Actions (CIASA), perturbs joint locations in an action sequence
such that the resulting adversarial sequence preserves the tempo-
ral coherence, spatial integrity, and the anthropomorphic plau-
sibility of the skeletons. CIASA achieves this feat by satisfying
multiple physical constraints, and employing spatial skeleton re-
alignments for the perturbed skeletons along with regularization
of the adversarial skeletons with Generative networks. We also
explore the possibility of semantically imperceptible localized
attacks with CIASA, and succeed in fooling the state-of-the-art
skeleton action recognition models with high confidence. CIASA
perturbations show high transferability for black-box attacks.
We also show that the perturbed skeleton sequences are able
to induce adversarial behavior in the RGB videos created with
computer graphics. A comprehensive evaluation with NTU and
Kinetics datasets ascertains the effectiveness of CIASA for graph-
based skeleton action recognition and reveals the imminent threat
to the spatio-temporal deep learning tasks in general.
Index Terms—Adversarial attack, Adversarial examples, Ac-
tion recognition, Skeleton actions, Adversarial perturbations,
Spatio-temporal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Skeleton representation provides the advantage of captur-
ing accurate human pose information while being invari-
ant to action-irrelevant details such as scene background,
clothing patterns and illumination conditions. This makes
skeleton-based action recognition an appealing approach [1]–
[6]. The problem is also interesting for multiple applica-
tion domains, including security, surveillance, animation and
human-computer interactions etc. Recent contributions in this
direction predominantly exploit deep models to encode spatio-
temporal dependencies of the skeleton sequences [7]–[10], and
achieve remarkable recognition accuracy on benchmark action
datasets [11]–[14].
Although deep learning has been successfully applied to
many complex problems, it is now known that deep models
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [15], [16]. These attacks
can alter model predictions at will by adding imperceptible
perturbations to the input. After the discovery of this intriguing
weakness of deep learning [15], many adversarial attacks have
surfaced for a variety of vision tasks [17]–[20]. Developing
and investigating these attacks not only enhances our under-
standing of the inner workings of the neural networks [21], but
Fig. 1. Constrained Iterative Attack for Skeleton Actions (CIASA) schematics.
Model gradients are computed for input action sequence to iteratively min-
imise the model’s loss for a target label in small step, while accounting for
the relevant spatio-temporal constraints. A generator-discriminator framework
further ensures anthropomorphic plausibility of the sekeltons. Besides cross-
model transferability, the attack can also affect RGB videos generated with
computer graphics using the skeletons perturbed by CIASA.
also provides valuable insights for improving the robustness
of deep learning in practical adversarial settings.
Deep models for skeleton-based action recognition may
also be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, adversarial
attacks on these models are yet to be explored. A major
challenge in this regard is that the skeleton data representation
differs significantly from image representation, for which the
existing attacks are primarily designed. Human skeleton data
is sparse and discrete that evolves over time in rigid spatial
configurations. This prevents an attacker from freely modi-
fying the skeletons without raising obvious attack suspicions.
Skeleton actions also allow only subtle perturbations along the
temporal dimension to preserve the natural action dynamics. In
summary, adversarial attacks on skeleton data must carefully
account for the skeleton’s spatial integrity, temporal coher-
ence and anthropomorphic plausibility. Otherwise, the attack
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2may be easily detectable. These challenges have so far kept
skeleton-based action recognition models away from being
scrutinized for adversarial robustness.
In this work, we present the first adversarial attack on deep
skeleton action recognition. In particular, we attack the (most)
promising branch of graph convolutional networks [22] for
skeleton-based action recognition [8]. These models represent
actions as spatio-temporal graphs that encode intra-body and
inter-frame connections as edges, and body joints as nodes.
Graph convolution operations are leveraged to model the
spatio-temporal dependencies within the skeleton sequences.
The physical significance of nodes and edges in these models
imposes unique constraints over the potential attacks. For
instance, the graph nodes for a skeleton sequence can not be
added or removed because the number of joints in the skeleton
must remain fixed. Similarly, the lengths of intra-body edges in
the graph can not be altered arbitrarily as they represent bones.
Moreover, inter-frame edges must always connect the same
joints along the temporal dimension. Rooted in the skeleton
data, such constraints thoroughly distinguish the adversarial
attacks on skeleton-based action recognition models from the
attacks developed for other kinds of graph networks [23].
We develop an iterative scheme called Constrained Iterative
Attack for Skeleton Actions (CIASA), to generate the desired
adversarial skeleton sequences, see Fig. 1. For a given action,
CIASA iteratively perturbs its skeleton sequence in small steps
to minimize the model prediction loss for a pre-selected target
class while satisfying multiple physical constraints to keep
the resulting adversarial sequence natural. In particular, it
accounts for spatio-temporal constraints that preserve intra-
skeleton joint connections, inter-frame joint connections, and
the skeleton bone lengths using a mechanism termed ‘spatial
skeleton realignment’. For perturbation imperceptibility, it
restricts the `∞-norm of the added noise. Additionally, it
imposes external temporal dynamics constraints for imper-
ceptible evolution of the adversarial patterns in the skeleton
sequence. To further ensure anthropomorphic plausibility of
the adversarial skeleton sequence, it exploits the Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN) framework [24]. The used GAN
configuration reduces the difference between the distribution
of adversarial samples generated by our iterative scheme and
the clean ground truth samples.
We analyze the proposed attack by allowing different modes
in which CIASA can be used by an attacker. Analogous to
standard image based attacks, we allow perturbation of all
skeleton joints in the basic mode. In a localized mode, we
provide the flexibility of perturbing only localized regions,
e.g. legs of skeleton. This type of attack is particularly suitable
to skeleton actions where an attacker may independently alter
motion of the least relevant joints for an action to change
the prediction. We also introduce an advanced attack mode
that further allows a hierarchical magnitude variation in joint
perturbations based on the graph structure of the joints.
The notion of localized perturbation also leads to semanti-
cally imperceptible perturbations under CIASA where signif-
icant perturbation still remains hard to perceive because it is
applied to the least significant joints for the original action
semantics. Besides demonstrating high fooling rates for the
state-of-the-art graph skeleton action recognition model ST-
GCN [8] on NTU [11] and Kinetics [25] datasets, we also
show high cross-model transferability of the proposed attack.
Additionally, we show that videos generated (using computer
graphics) from the adversarial skeletons (CIASA’s advanced
mode) result in lower action recognition accuracy implying
that the attack can be launched in the real world. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first of its kind demonstration
of transferability of adversarial attacks beyond a single data
modality.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We review
the related literature in Section II. The relevant concepts of
graph skeleton action recognition are revisited in Section III
along with the problem formulation. In Section IV, we give
the implementation details of the proposed attack scheme.
Experimental results are provided in Section V. The article
concludes in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Skeleton-based Action Recognition
The use of skeleton data in action recognition becomes
popular as reliable skeleton data can be obtained from modern
RGB-D sensors (e.g. Microsoft Kinect), or extracted from
images taken from a single RGB camera [26]. A skeleton
action is represented as a sequence of human skeletons, which
encode rich spatio-temporal information regarding human
motions. Early research in skeleton-based action recognition
formulated skeleton joints and their temporal variations as
trajectories [2]. Huang et al. [27] incorporated the Lie group
structure into the task, and transformed the high-dimensional
Lie group trajectory into temporally aligned Lie group features
for skeleton-based action recognition.
To leverage the power of convolutional neural network, Du
et al. [3] represented a skeleton sequence as a matrix by
concatenating the joint coordinates. The matrix is arranged
as an image which can be fed into CNN for recognition. Sim-
ilarly, Ke et al. [5] transformed a skeleton sequence into three
clips of gray-scale images that encode spatial dependencies
between the joints by inserting reference joints. To fit the
target neural networks, these methods re-size the transformed
images. Liu et al. [28] proposed a universal unit “skepxel” to
create images of arbitrary dimensions for CNN processing.
In addition to CNNs, Recurrent Neural Networks are also
employed to model temporal dependencies in skeleton based
human action analysis [29]–[31].
To directly process the sparse skeleton data with neural
networks, graph convolutional network (GCN) [22] is used
for action recognition. Since GCN is particularly relevant to
this work, we review its relevant literature and application to
action recognition in more detail.
B. Graph Convolution Networks
The topology of human skeleton joints is a typical graph
structure, where the joints and bones are respectively inter-
preted as graph nodes and edges. Consequently, there have
been several recent attempts in modeling human skeleton
3actions using graph representation and exploiting the spatio-
temporal dependencies in skeleton sequences with the help of
graph-based convolutional network (GCN).
Yan et al. [8] used graph convolutional networks as a
spatial-temporal model (ST-GCN) that aims to capture embed-
ded patterns in the spatial configuration of skeleton joints and
their temporal dynamics simultaneously. Along the skeleton
sequence, they defined a graph convolution operation, where
the input is the joint coordinate vectors on the graph nodes.
The convolution kernel samples the neighboring joints within
the skeleton frame as well as the temporally connected joints
at a defined temporal range.
Tang et al. [32] incorporated deep reinforcement learning
with graph neural network to recognize skeleton-based actions.
Their model distills the most informative skeleton frames and
discards the ambiguous ones. As opposed to previous works
where joints dependency is limited in the real physical con-
nection (intrinsic dependency), they proposed extrinsic joint
dependency, which exploits the relationship between joints
that have physical disconnection. Since, graph representation
of skeleton is crucial to graph convolution, Gao et al. [33]
formulated the skeleton graph representation as an optimiza-
tion problem, and proposed graph regression to statistically
learn the underlying graph from multiple observations. The
learned sparse graph pattern links both physical and non-
physical edges of skeleton joints, along with the spatio-
temporal dimension of the skeleton action sequences.
To justify the importance of bones’ motions in skeleton
action recognition, Zhang et al. [34] focused on skeleton
bones and extended the graph convolution from graph nodes to
graph edges. Their proposed graph edge convolution defines
a receptive field of edges, which consists of a center edge
and its spatio-temporal neighbours. By combining the graph
edge and node convolutions, they proposed a two-stream graph
neural network, which achieved remarkable performances on
benchmark datasets. Similarly, Shi et al. [35] also proposed a
two-stream framework to model joints and bones information
simultaneously.
C. Adversarial Attacks on Graph Data
Adversarial attacks [15] have recently attracted significant
research attention [36], resulting in few attacks on graph data
as well. However, compared to the adversarial attacks for
image data [16], [37]–[39], several new challenges appear
in attacking graph data [40]. First, the graph structure and
features of graph nodes are in discrete domain with certain pre-
defined structures, which leaves a lower degree of freedom for
creating adversarial perturbations. Second, the imperceptibility
of adversarial perturbations in graph data is neither easy to
define nor straightforward to achieve, as the discrete graph
data inherently prevents infinitesimal small changes [23].
Dai et al. [41] focused on attacking structural information,
i.e. adding/deleting graph edges, to launch adversarial attacks
on graph structured data. Given the gradient information of
target classifier, one of their proposed attacks modifies the
graph edges that are most likely to change the objective. In
addition to modifying graph edges, Zu¨gner et al. [23] adopted
an attack strategy to modify the graph node features as well
as graph edge structure. To ensure the imperceptibility of
adversarial perturbations, they designed constraints based on
power-law [42] to preserve the degree distribution of graph
structures and feature statistics.
Being atypical graph data, human skeletons have several
unique properties. In a human skeleton, the graph edges
represent rigid human bones, which connect finite number of
human joints to form a standard spatial configuration. Unlike
graph data with mutable graph structure (e.g. social network
graph [43]), the human bones are fixed in terms of both
joint connections and bone lengths. This property implies that
attacking human skeletons by adding or deleting bones will
be detected easily by observers. The hierarchical nature of
human skeleton data is also different from normal graph data,
as in human skeleton the motion of children joints/bones are
affected by their parents’ behaviours. This chain-like motion
kinetics of human skeletons must be considered when launch-
ing adversarial attacks on skeleton actions. Hence, despite the
existence of adversarial attacks on graph data, robustness of
skeleton based human action recognition against adversarial
attacks remains largely unexplored.
In this work, we specifically focus on adversarial attacks on
human skeleton sequences to fool skeleton-based action recog-
nition models. To design effective and meaningful attacks, we
take the spatial and temporal attributes of skeleton data into
account while creating the adversarial perturbations. Due to
its wide-spread use in graph convolution network based action
recognition, we select ST-GCN [8] as our target model, and
launch our attack against it. However, our attack is generic
for similar graph based model. In the section to follow, we
formulate our problem in the context of skeleton based human
action recognition.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
To formulate the problem, we first briefly revisit the
spatio-temporal graph convolutional network ST-GCN [8]
for skeleton-based action recognition. Using this prerequisite
knowledge, we subsequently formalize our problem of adver-
sarial attacks on skeleton action recognition.
A. Revisiting ST-GCN
An action in skeleton domain is represented as a sequence of
T skeleton frames, where every skeleton consists of N body
joints. Given such N × T volumes of joints, an undirected
spatio-temporal graph G = (V,E) can be constructed, where
V denotes the node set of graph and E is the edge set. Here,
V = {vti|t = 1, . . . , T, i = 1, . . . , N} encodes the skeleton
joints. An element ‘v’ of this set can also be considered to
encode a joint’s Cartesian coordinates. Two kinds of graph
edges E are defined for joints, namely; intra-body edge ES
and inter-frame edge EF . Specifically, ES is represented
as an N × N adjacency matrix of graph nodes, where the
matrix element ESij = 1|i 6= j identifies that a physical bone
connection exists between the body joint vi and vj . The inter-
frame edges EF denotes the connections of the same joints
4between consecutive frames, which can also be treated as
temporal trajectories of the skeleton joints.
Given the spatio-temporal skeleton graph G, a graph con-
volution operation is defined by extending the conventional
image-based convolution. Along the spatial dimension, graph
convolution is conducted on a graph node vi around its
neighboring nodes vj ∈ B(vi):
fout(vi) =
∑
vj∈B(vi)
1
Zi(vj)
fin(vj) · w(li(vj)), (1)
where B is the sampling function to define a neighboring
node set for the joint vi, fin is the input feature map, w is
the weight function which indexes convolution weight vectors
based on the labels of neighboring nodes vj , and Zi(vj) is the
number of neighboring nodes to normalize the inner product.
The labels of neighboring nodes are assigned with a labelling
function l : B(vi) → {0, . . . ,K − 1}, where K defines
the spatial kernel size. ST-GCN employs different skeleton
partitioning strategies for the labelling purpose. To conduct
graph convolution in spatio-temporal dimensions, the sampling
function B(v) and the labelling function l(v) are extended
to cover a pre-defined temporal range Γ, which decides the
temporal kernel size.
ST-GCN [8] adopts the implementation of graph convolu-
tion network in [22] to create a 9-layer neural network with
temporal kernel size Γ = 9 for each layer. Starting from 64,
the number of channels is doubled for every 3 layers. The
resulting tensor is pooled at the last layer to produce a feature
vector ffinal ∈ R256, which is fed to a Softmax classifier for
predicting the action label. The network mapping function is
compactly represented as:
ZG,c = Fθ(V,E) = arg max < softmax(ffinal) >, (2)
where θ denotes the network parameters. We use ZG,c to
denote the probability of assigning spatio-temporal skeleton
graph G to class c ∈ C = {1, 2, . . . , ck}. After training,
the network parameters are fine-tuned to minimize the cross
entropy loss between the predicted class c and the ground truth
cgt that maximizes the probability ZG,c|c = cgt for the dataset
under consideration.
B. Adversarial Attack on Skeleton Action Recognition
Given an original spatio-temporal skeleton graph G0 =
(V 0, E0), and a trained ST-GCN model Fθ, our goal is to
apply adversarial perturbation to the graph G0, resulting in
a perturbed graph G′ = (V ′, E′) that satisfies the following
broad constraint:
ZG′,c = Fθ(V ′, E′), s.t. c 6= cgt (3)
Below, we examine this objective from various aspects to
compute effective adversarial perturbations for the skeleton
action recognition.
1) Feature and structure perturbations : As explained in
Section III-A, V denotes the skeleton joints whose elements
can be represented as the Cartesian coordinates of joints,
e.g. vti : {xti, yti, zti}. For a particular node vti in the skeleton
graph G, an adversarial attack can change its original location
such that v′ti = v0ti+ρti, where ρti ∈ R3 is the adversarial per-
turbation for the node vti. We refer to this type of perturbation
as feature perturbation. Alternatively, one can define structure
perturbation that aims at changing the adjacency relationship
in a graph such that E′ij 6= E0ij |i, j ∈ V , where V denotes the
set of affected graph nodes.
In a spatio-temporal skeleton graph G, perturbing edges
have strong physical implications. Recall that intra-body con-
nections of joints define the rigid bones within a skeleton,
and inter-frame connections define the temporal movements of
the joints. Changes to these connections can lead to skeleton
sequences that cannot be interpreted as any meaningful human
action. Hence, the objective in Eq. 3 must further be con-
strained to preserve the graph structure while computing the
perturbation. To account for that, we must modify the overall
constraint to:
ZG′,c = Fθ(V ′, E0), s.t. c 6= cgt. (4)
2) Perturbation imperceptibility: Imperceptibility is an
important attribute of adversarial attacks, as adversaries are
likely to fool deep models in unnoticeable ways. Here, we
explore perturbation imperceptibility in the context of skeleton
actions. This leads to further constraints that must be satisfied
when launching adversarial attacks on a skeleton graph G.
For the conventional image data, imperceptibility of pertur-
bations is typically achieved by restricting ‖ρ‖p < ξ, where
‖ · ‖p denotes the `p-norm of a vector with p ∈ [0,∞), and
ξ is a pre-defined constant [44]. For the skeleton graph data,
however, the graph structure is discrete and graph nodes are
dependent on each other, which makes it more challenging
to keep a valid perturbation fully imperceptible. We tackle
the challenge of perceptibility for skeleton perturbations from
multiple point of views that results in multiple constraints for
the overall objective, as explained in the following paragraphs.
Joints variation constraint:
Focusing on feature perturbation on skeleton graph, the
location of a target skeleton joint is changed such that v′ti =
v0ti + ρti. It is intuitive to constrain ρ of every target joint
in a small range to avoid breaking the spatial integrity of the
skeleton. Hence, we employ the following constraint:
‖ρti‖∞ 6 i | t ∈ [1, . . . , T ]; i ∈ [1, . . . , N ], (5)
where ‖ · ‖∞ denotes `∞-norm, and i is a pre-fixed constant.
By restricting the joint variations to a small `∞-ball, we
encourage perturbation imperceptibility. From the implemen-
tation view point, when the ball radius  is constant for all
joints, we call it global clipping of the perturbed joints, and
when the value of i is joint-dependent, we call it hierarchical
clipping.
Bone length constraint:
In a skeleton graph G, the intra-body graph connections
ES represent rigid human bones, hence their lengths must be
preserved despite the perturbations. In the case of ESij = 1|i 6=
j, the length of the bone between joint i and j at frame t can be
calculated as Bij,t = ‖vti−vtj‖2. After applying perturbations
to the graph, the new bone length B′ij,t = ‖v′ti−v′tj‖2 should
5satisfy the following:
Bij,t = B
′
ij,t | t ∈ [1, . . . , T ] s.t. ESij = 1. (6)
Temporal dynamics constraint: Due to the spatio-temporal
nature of skeleton action graphs, we disentangle the restric-
tions over perturbations into spatial and temporal constrains.
Previous paragraphs mainly focused on the spatial constraints.
Here, we analyze the problem from a temporal perspective.
A skeleton action is a sequence of skeleton frames that
transit smoothly along the temporal dimension. A skeleton
perturbation may lead to random jitters in the temporal tra-
jectories of the joints and compromise the smooth tempo-
ral dynamics of the target skeleton action. To address this
problem, we impose an explicit temporal constraint over
the perturbations. Inspired by [26], we penalize acceleration
of the perturbed joints to enforce temporal stability. Given
consecutive perturbed skeleton frames f ′t−1,f
′
t , and f
′
t+1, the
acceleration is calculated as f¨ ′t = f
′
t+1 + f
′
t−1 − 2f ′t . Note
that, f ′t = {v′ti|i = 1, . . . , N}, where N is the number of
perturbed skeleton joints. The calculation of acceleration is
conducted on individual joints. We optimize our attacker, A
(discussed further below) by including the following temporal
smoothness loss in the overall objective:
Lsmooth(A) = 1
T − 1
T∑
t=2
f¨ ′t =
1
T − 1
T∑
t=2
N∑
i=1
v¨′ti, (7)
where T denotes the number of time steps considered. In the
text to follow, we use f¨ ′t to denote the joint acceleration for
notational simplification.
3) Anthropomorphic plausibility: After adversarial pertur-
bation is applied to a skeleton, the resulting skeleton can
become anthropomorphically implausible. For instance, the
perturbed arms and legs may bend unnaturally, or significant
self-intersections may occur within the perturbed armature.
Such unnatural behaviour can easily raise attack suspicions.
Therefore, this potential behavior needs to be regularized while
computing the perturbations.
Let P define the distribution of natural skeleton graphs.
A sample graph G0 is drawn from this distribution with
probability P(G0). We can treat an adversarial skeleton’s
graph G′ to be a sample of another similar distribution P ′. The
latter distribution should closely resemble the former under the
restriction of minimal perturbation of joints and anthropomor-
phic plausibility of the skeletons. Hence, to obtain effective
adversarial skeletons we aim at reducing the distribution gap
between P and P ′. To that end, we employ a Generative Ad-
versarial Network (GAN) [24] to learn appropriate distribution
in a data-driven manner.
Specifically, we model a skeleton action ‘attacker’ as a
function A such that G′ = A(G0). In the common GAN setup,
the attacker can be interpreted as a generator of perturbed
skeletons (see Fig. 1). We set up a binary classification network
as the discriminator D. The discriminator accepts either the
natural graph G˜ or the perturbed graph G′ as its input, and
predicts the probability that the input graph came from P .
The G˜ and G′ are kept ‘unpaired’, implying G˜ and G0 are
different graphs sampled from the distribution P . To formulate
the adversarial learning process, we leverage the least squares
objective [45] to train the attacker A and the discriminator D
using the following loss functions:
Ladv(A) = EG′∼P′ [(D(G′)− 1)2], (8)
Ladv(D) = EG˜∼P [(D(G˜)− 1)2] + EG′∼P′ [D(G′)2]. (9)
During training, A and D are optimized jointly. We discuss
the related implementation details in Section IV.
4) Localized joint perturbation: Unlike the pixel space of
images, a skeleton action graph has highly discrete structure
along both spatial and temporal dimensions. This discreteness
poses unconventional challenges for adversarial attacks in
this domain. Nevertheless, it also gives rise to interesting
investigation directions. For instance, it is intriguing to de-
vise a localized adversarial attack which fools the model by
perturbing only a particular part of the skeleton graph. If we
closely observe a skeleton action, it is clear that different
body joints contribute differently to our perception of actions.
Additionally, most of the human actions are recognizable
by the motion patterns associated with the dominant body
parts, e.g. arms and legs. Such observations make localized
perturbations particularly relevant to the skeleton data.
Localized joint perturbations allow for less variations in the
overall skeleton, which is beneficial for imperceptibility. They
also provide a controlled injection of regional modification to
the target skeleton action. To allow that, we define a subset
of joints within a skeleton as the attack region. Only the
joints in that region are modified for localized perturbations.
Consequently, all the constraints in Section III-B2 still hold
for the attack.
IV. ATTACKER IMPLEMENTATION
A. One-Step Attack
First, we adopt the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [16]
as a primitive attack to create skeleton perturbation V ′ in a
single step. This adoption allows us to put our attack in a
better context for the active community in the direction of
adversarial attacks. For the FGSM based attack in our setup,
the perturbation computation can be expressed as:
V ′ = V 0 +  sign(∇V 0L(Fθ(V 0, E0), cgt)) (10)
where Fθ denotes trained ST-GCN [8] model, L is the cross-
entropy loss for action recognition, and ∇V 0 is the derivative
operation that computes the gradient of ST-GCN loss w.r.t. V 0,
given the current model parameters θ and the ground truth
action label cgt. The sign of gradient is scaled with a parameter
, and added to the original graph V 0. The FGSM-based attack
is computationally efficient as it takes only a single step in the
direction of increasing the recognition loss of the target model.
The basic FGSM attack does not specify the label for the
misclassified action, and therefore is a ‘non-targeted’ attack.
If we specify a particular label for cgt in Eq. 10, and subtract
the gradient’s sign from the original graph V 0 (instead of
adding it, as in Eq. 10) the resulting attack becomes a targeted
attack [46] that is likely to change the predicted label of the
considered action to a pre-specified label.
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The FGSM attack takes a single step over the model cost
surface to increase the loss for the given input. An intuitive
extension of this notion is to iteratively take multiple steps
while adjusting the step direction [47]. For the iterative attack,
we also adopt the same technique for the skeleton graph input.
However, here we focus on targeted attacks. This is because
(a) targeted attacks are more interesting for the real-world
applications, and (b) non-targeted attacks can essentially be
considered a degenerate case of the targeted attack, where
the target label is chosen at random. Hence, an effective
targeted attack already ensures non-targeted model fooling.
To implement, we specify the desired target class and take
multiple steps in the direction of decreasing the prediction
loss of the model for the target class.
We implement the iterative targeted attack while enforcing
the constraints discussed in Section III-B2. The resulting al-
gorithm is termed as Constrained Iterative Attack for Skeleton
Actions (CIASA). At the core of CIASA is the following
iterative process:
V ′0 = V
0; V ′N+1 = C(V ′N − α (∇V ′NLCIASA(V ′N , ctarget))),
(11)
At each iteration, V ′N is adjusted towards the direction of
minimizing the overall CIASA loss LCIASA using a step size
α. This is equivalent to a gradient descent iteration with α
as the learning rate, where the skeleton graph V ′N is treated
as the model parameter. Hence, we directly exploit the Adam
Optimizer [48] in the PyTorch library1 for this computation.
The operation C(.) in Eq. 11 truncates and realigns the values
in its argument with pre-set conditions, explained below.
In Eq. 11, the overall CIASA loss LCIASA consists of the
following components:
LCIASA = Lpred + λ(Lsmooth + Ladv)) (12)
where Lpred is the cross-entropy loss of the model prediction
on V ′ for the desired target class ctarget. Lsmooth is the
temporal smoothness loss calculated according to Eq. 7. GAN
regularization loss Ladv is a combination of Ladv(A) and
Ladv(D) given in Eq. 8 and Eq. 9. λ is a weighting hyper-
parameter to balance the individual loss components.
Implementing the process identified by Eq. 11 produces the
perturbed skeleton V ′ that fools the model into miscalssifying
the original action as ctarget, while complying to the spatio-
temporal constraints derived in the previous Sections. The
pseudo-code of implementing the process of Eq. 11 as CIASA
is presented in Algorithm 1. The algorithm starts with a
forward-pass of V ′ through the target model Fθ(), i.e. ST-
GCN. The respective losses are then computed to form the
overall CIASA loss LCIASA. At line 6, Ladv is computed as
the accumulation of the losses defined in Eq. 8 and Eq. 9.
Here, we replace G with V based on the algorithm context.
Dω denotes the discriminator network which is parameterized
by ω. Note that, the real data V˜ and the perturbed data V ′
are unpaired, as discussed in Sect. III-B3. On line 8, the
gradient information is obtained through the back propagation
1https://pytorch.org/
Algorithm 1 Constrained iterative attacker A to fool skeleton-
base action recognition.
Input: Original graph nodes V 0 ∈ R3×N×T , trained ST-GCN
model Fθ(), desired target class ctarget, perturbation clipping
factor , max iter=M , learning rate α
Output: Perturbed graph nodes V ′ ∈ R3×N×T .
1: set initial V ′ = V 0
2: while i < M do
3: feed forward Z = Fθ(V ′)
4: Lpred = CrossEntroyLoss(Z, ctarget)
5: Lsmooth = 1T−1
∑T
t=2 f¨
′
t
6: Ladv = (Dω(V ′)− 1)2 + (Dω(V˜ )− 1)2 +Dω(V ′)2
7: LCIASA = Lpred + λ(Lsmooth + Ladv)
8: (LCIASA).Backward()⇒ gradients
9: V ′, ω = AdamOptimizer([V ′, ω], gradients)
10: if |V ′ − V 0| >  then
11: V ′ = Clip(V ′) ∼ [V 0 − , V 0 + ])
12: end if
13: Skeleton realignment V ′ = SSR(V′)
14: i = i+ 1
15: end while
16: return V ′
operation denoted as ‘.Backward()’. We employ the Adam
Optimizer [48] to update the skeleton joints V ′ and the
discriminator parameters ω. Clipping operation is then applied
to truncate V ′ to pre-set ranges. In our case, the scaling factor
 restricts the `∞-norm of the perturbation at graph nodes.
For global clipping,  ∈ R is a scalar value that results in
equal clipping on all joints. For the hierarchical clipping,
 ∈ RN defines different clipping strengths for different
joint. The clipping imposes the joint variation constraint
over the perturbations. To impose the bone length constraint,
Spatial Skeleton Realignment (SSR) is proposed to realign
the skeleton bones within the clipped V ′ according to the
original bone lengths. Note that the operations of clipping and
realignment constitute the function C(.) shown in Eq. 11. We
empirically set the weight factor λ as 10, and the base learning
rate for the Adam Optimizer α as 0.01. Below we discuss the
implementation of SSR and discriminator network D.
1) Spatial Skeleton Realignment: We propose Spatial
Skeleton Realignment (SSR) to preserve the bone length
constraint as we perturb the skeleton graph. SSR is executed
at each iteration after V ′ is updated and clipped in order to
realign every perturbed skeleton frame based on the original
bone lengths. Specifically, for every updated skeleton joint v′j ,
we find its parent joint v′i along the intra-body edge E
S . The
bone between joints i and j is defined as a vector b′ij = v
′
j−v′i.
Then, we modify the joint v′j along the vector direction b′ij to
meet the constraint in Eq 6. The modification applied to v′j
is also applied to all of its children/grandchildren joints. To
complete the SSR, the above process starts from the root joint
and propagates through the whole skeleton.
72) GAN Regularization: To enforce the anthropomorphic
plausibility of the perturbed skeleton action, the adversarial
regularization term Ladv is optimized jointly with the other
attack objectives. Taking per-frame skeleton feature map, say
X as the input, a discriminator network D is trained to classify
the skeleton as fake or real (i.e. perturbed v.s original), while
the attacker A is competing with D to increase the probability
of the perturbed skeleton being classified as real.
We leverage the angles between skeleton bones to construct
the feature map X . For a pair of bones bij and buv , the
corresponding element in the feature map is defined as the
cosine distance between the bones as:
xij−uv =
bij · buv
‖bij‖‖buv‖ (13)
We select a group of major bones to construct the feature map
X , while insignificant bones of fingers and toes are excluded
to avoid unnecessary noise. The resulting feature map has
dimension X ∈ RC,H,W , where C = 1, and H = W equals
to the number of selected bones. We model D as a binary
classification network that consists of two convolution layers
and one fully-connected layer. The convolution kernel size is
3, and the number of channels produced by the convolution
is 32. D outputs values in the range [0, 1], signifying the
probability that X is a real sample.
V. EXPERIMENTS
Below we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attack
for skeleton-based action recognition. We examine different
attack modes on standard skeleton action datasets. We also
demonstrate the transferability of attack and explore general-
ization of the computed adversarial perturbations beyond the
skeleton data modality. Lastly, an ablation study is provided to
highlight the contributions of various constraints to the overall
fooling rate achieved by the proposed attack.
A. Dataset and Evaluation Metric
NTU RGB+D: NTU RGB+D Human Activity Dataset is
collected with Kinect v2 camera and includes 56,880 action
samples. Each action has RGB, depth, skeleton and infra-red
data associated with it. However, we are only concerned with
the skeleton data in this work. For the skeleton-based action
recognition with ST-GCN, we follow the standard protocols
defined in [11], i.e. cross-subject and cross-view recognition.
Accordingly, two different ST-GCN models are used in our
experiments, one for each protocol. We denote these models
as NTUXS and NTUXV for cross-subject and cross-view
recognition. While the original dataset is split into training
and testing sets, we only manipulate the testing set, as no
separate training data is required for the attack.
Kinetics: Kinetics dataset [25] is a large unconstrained
action dataset with 400 action classes. For skeleton-based
action recognition using this data, the original ST-GCN [8]
first uses OpenPose [49], [50] to estimate 2D skeletons with
18 body joints. Then, the estimation confidence ‘c’ for every
joint is concatenated to its 2D coordinates (x, y) to form a tuple
(x,y,c). The tuples for all joints in a skeleton are collectively
considered as an input sample by the ST-GCN model. For the
adversarial attack, we mask the channel of confidence values
and only perturb the (x,y) components for the Kinetics dataset.
Evaluation metric: The evaluation metric used to evaluate
the success of adversarial attacks is known as fooling rate [36].
It indicates the percentage of data samples over which the
model changes its predicted label after the samples have been
adversarially perturbed. In the adversarial attacks literature,
this is the most commonly used metric to evaluate an attack’s
performance [36]. In the case of targeted attacks, it determines
the percentage of the samples successfully misclassified as the
target label after the attack.
B. Non-targeted Attack
Since this is the first work in the direction of attacking
skeleton-based action recognition, it is important to put our
attacking technique into perspective. Hence, we first conduct
a simpler non-targeted attack on NTU and Kinetics datasets
using the one-step attack discussed in Section IV-A, Eq. (10).
We compute the fooling rates for both datasets under different
values of the perturbation scaling factor . Both cross-view and
cross-subject protocols were considered in this experiment for
the NTU dataset. The fooling rates achieved with the one-step
method for various  values are summarized in Fig. 2. As
can be seen, the non-targeted fooling is reasonably successful
under the proposed formulation of the problem for skeleton-
based action recognition. The fooling rates for all protocols
remain higher than 90% once the  value reaches 0.02. This
is still a reasonably small perturbation value that is equivalent
to one twentieth of the average skeleton height.
To visualize perturbed skeletons, Fig. 3(a) shows a success-
ful attack on NTU dataset for cross-view fooling. The original
and perturbed skeletons are plotted with green and red colors
respectively. Note that, in this illustration and the examples
to follow, we provide a positional offset between different
skeletons for better visualization. For the shown sequence
of skeleton frames, the original label is ‘Brush hair’, that is
predicted as ‘Wipe face’ after the attack is performed. The
temporal dimension evolves from left to right. Ignoring the
positional offset, it is easy to see that the perturbation generally
remains hard to perceive in the skeleton.
C. Targeted Attack
We use the proposed CIASA attacker explained in Sec-
tion IV-B, Alg. 1 to conduct targeted attacks on both NTU and
Kinetics datasets. We specify the least-likely action prediction
of the ST-GCN models as the target label ctarget as described
in Eq. 11, implying that the most challenging misclassification
target is chosen to launch attacks. CIASA is configured to
launch attacks in three modes; namely, basic mode, localized
mode, and advanced mode. Below we discuss these modes
along the experimental results.
Figure 3(b) shows an example of CIASA attack in the basic
mode. We apply the global clipping discussed in Section III-B2
in this attack mode, where all the skeleton joints are perturbed
with the same scaling factor  = 0.02. With this setting, the
original action of ‘Cheer up’ in Figure 3(b) is misinterpreted
8Fig. 2. Fooling rates (%) achieved by one-step non-targeted attack with
different perturbation scaling factors for NTU and Kinetics datasets. Both
cross-subject NTUXS and cross-view NTUXV protocols are considered for
the NTU dataset.
TABLE I
FOOLING RATES (%) ACHIEVED BY CIASA TARGETED ATTACK (BASIC
MODE) WITH DIFFERENT GLOBAL CLIPPING STRENGTH  FOR NTU AND
KINETICS DATASETS. BOTH CROSS-SUBJECT NTUXS AND CROSS-VIEW
NTUXV PROTOCOLS ARE CONSIDERED FOR THE NTU DATASET.
 (× 1e-3) 4 6 8 10 12
Kinetics 82.5 92.5 96.5 97.5 99.3
NTUXS 89.4 96.6 98.7 99.2 99.8
NTUXV 78.2 85.5 93.3 98.9 99.6
as ‘Kicking’ with confidence score 99.4%. In the basic mode,
the comparison of fooling rates with different  values for the
two benchmark datasets are summarized in Table I. Firstly,
the results demonstrate successful fooling even for very low 
values. Secondly, it is noteworthy that for similar  values,
higher fooling rates are generally achieved by CIASA for
targeted fooling as compared to the non-targeted fooling of the
one step method in Fig. 2. This demonstrates the strength of
CIASA as a targeted attack. In our experiments, we observed
that the least-likely label of ST-GCN model remains similar
for multiple actions. Whereas the presented results do not
diversify the target labels of such actions to strictly follow the
evaluation protocol, it is possible to manually do so. Loosening
the evaluation criterion on these lines will further improve the
fooling rate of CIASA.
In Fig. 3(c), we shows an example of CIASA attack in
the localized mode, where the localized joint perturbation
discussed in Section III-B4 is applied. In this example, two
legs of skeleton are set to be the attack regions, which allow
8 active joints for perturbations. The remaining joints are
unaffected by the computed perturbations. Compared to the
basic mode, fewer joints contribute to the overall perturbation
in the localized mode. To compensate for the reduced number
of active joints, we loose the perturbation scaling factor and set
 to 0.08 for this experiment. For the shown example, CIASA
achieves fooling with 93.2% confidence for this mode, which
is still competitive to the 99.4% confidence in the basic mode.
TABLE II
FOOLING RATE(%) ACHIEVED BY CIASA TARGETED ATTACK
(LOCALIZED MODE) WITH DIFFERENT ATTACK REGIONS ON NTU
DATASET. BOTH CROSS-SUBJECT AND CROSS-VIEW PROTOCOLS ARE
EVALUATED. GLOBAL CLIPPING STRENGTH IS SET TO  = 0.04.
Attack region set-1 set-2 set-3 set-4
NTUXS 90.8 93.3 61.3 83.3
NTUXV 85.2 91.7 60.0 81.7
To further evaluate the localized mode of CIASA with
different attack regions, we split the skeleton joints into 4 sets,
as illustrated in Fig. 4. Then, we conduct CIASA localized
attack on NTU dataset for the 4 sets separately. Global clipping
is applied for these experiments with the scaling factor  =
0.04. The chosen value of  is intentionally kept lower than that
in Fig. 3(c) because we focus on analysing the fooling prowess
of different attack regions instead of simply achieving high
fooling rates for all the regions. The results of our experiments
are summarized in Table II. It is clear that the CIASA localized
attack achieves impressive fooling rates by perturbing only a
small set of joints within the skeleton. In addition, different
sets of active joints affect the fooling performance differently.
In Table II, set-1 and set-2 achieve higher fooling rates than
the other two sets. This can be explained by the observation
that many dominant movements in the NTU dataset occur at
the upper part of human body.
We also extend the localized mode of CIASA to an ad-
vanced mode by replacing the global clipping by hierarchical
clipping discussed in Section III-B2. In that case, the scalar
clipping value  is replaced by  ∈ RN , where N is the number
of active joints to be perturbed. Here, we allow various active
joints to change in pre-defined ranges by using differentiated
clipping values. One strategy to differentiate the clipping
strength is applying incremental  variables from parent joints
to their children joints, based on the observation that children
joints normally move in larger ranges than their parents. Fig-
ure 3(d) illustrates an example of successful advanced attack
on NTU dataset with two legs activated for the attack. The 
variables are set to 0.01, 0.05, 0.15, 0.25 for the joint hips,
knees, ankles, and feet, respectively. Note that we intentionally
amplify the perturbation ranges at certain joints such as ankles
and feet, which results in noticeable perturbations at the attack
region. We will justify the intuition behind this differential
clipping in the paragraphs to follow. For now, notice that in
Fig. 3(d), the original label of ‘Cheer up’ is misclassified as
‘Kicking’ with a confidence score 96.1% with the advanced
attack.
Although the CIASA attack in advanced mode apparently
sacrifices the visual imperceptibility of the perturbation, it
is able to maintain the “semantic imperceptibility” for the
perturbed skeleton. We corroborate this claim with the fol-
lowing observations. First, in Fig. 3(d), the dominant body
movements for ‘Cheer up’ action mainly occur in the up-
per part of the skeleton, while the fooling is conducted by
perturbing the lower body to which less attention is paid for
this action. Consequently, the attack does not incur significant
9Fig. 3. TOP: (row a) One-step attack with  = 0.02 is shown where “brush hair” action is misclassified as “wipe face”. BOTTOM: CIASA targeted attack
in different modes are shown. (row b) The basic mode that perturbs all joints with  = 0.01. (row c) The localized mode with only two legs allowed to be
perturbed. Global clipping is applied with  = 0.08. (d) The advanced mode where the same two legs are perturbed with hierarchical clipping. The attacks in
all modes successfully fool the recognition model with confidences higher than 90%. The temporal dimension evolves from left to right.
Fig. 4. The skeleton of NTU dataset is spitted into 4 attack regions, each
of which is activated to apply CIASA localized attacks. Every attack region
consists of roughly the same number of joints.
perceptual attention in the first place. Furthermore, due to the
spatio-temporal constraints with CIASA attacks, the injected
perturbation patterns remain smooth and natural. This further
reduces the attack suspicions, as compared to any small but
unnatural perturbations, e.g. shakiness around the joints.
Further to the above discussion, the perturbations generated
in the advanced mode can not only fool the recognition model
in skeleton spaces, but can also be imitated and reproduced
in the Physical world. Imagine an end-to-end skeleton-based
action recognition system using a monocular camera as its
input sensor. For that, RGB images taken from the Physical
world are first converted to skeleton frames, which are then
passed through the skeleton-based action recognition model.
For this typical pipeline, it may be inconvenient to interfere
with the intermediate skeleton data for the attacking purpose.
However, the adversarial perturbations can be injected into the
input RGB data by performing an action in front of the camera
while imitating the perturbation patterns with selective body
parts. The advanced mode of CIASA allows the discovery
of perturbation patterns for such attacks. This is elaborated
further in Section V-D2 with relevant context.
D. Transferability of Attack
We examine the transferability of the proposed CIASA at-
tack from two perspectives. First, we evaluate the cross-model
transferability of the generated perturbations. Concretely, we
attack a skeleton action recognition model A to generate
perturbed skeletons. Then, we predict the label of the perturbed
skeletons using model B and examine the fooling rate for
model B. We respectively chose ST-GCN and 2s-AGCN [10]
as model A and B in our experiments.
Second, we analyze the cross-modality transferability of
CIASA attack. i.e. we generate perturbations for one data
modality and test their fooling capability in another data
modality. We formulate this task as transferring perturbations
from skeleton data to RGB data, as RGB cameras are widely
used as input sensors for the real world systems. For the cross-
modality test, we generate perturbed skeletons by attacking the
ST-GCN. Then, those skeletons are converted to RGB actions
using a graphics rendering pipeline. To examine whether the
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF CROSS-MODEL RECOGNITION ACCURACY (%) AND
FOOLING RATE (%) ON THREE CONFIGURATIONS OF 2S-AGCN FOR
CROSS-VIEW NTU PROTOCOL. ‘ORIGINAL ACCURACY’ IS ON CLEAN
DATA. ‘ATTACKED ACCURACY’ IS ON PERTURBED DATA.
Model Js-AGCN Bs-AGCN 2s-AGCN
Original Accuracy 93.7 93.2 95.1
Attacked Accuracy 13.5 6.8 11.8
Fooling rate (%) 86.1 93.1 88.4
adversarial information can be preserved during the conver-
sion, we predict the label of RGB actions under the usual
skeleton-based action recognition pipeline for the ST-GCN.
1) Cross-Model Transferability: The 2s-AGCN [10] is a
two-stream adaptive graph convolutional network for skeleton-
based action recognition. This network is significantly differ-
ent from the ST-GCN [8] as it models a learnable topology of
the skeleton graph. In addition to the joint locations, 2s-AGCN
also models the bone directions, which results in a two-stream
network structure.
We first generate perturbed skeleton actions based on ST-
GCN model. The basic mode of CIASA with global clip-
ping is employed, where the perturbation scaling factor  is
empirically set to 0.012. The cross-view protocol of NTU
dataset is adopted to create perturbed skeletons, which are
then evaluated by 2s-AGCN models. We compare the change
of recognition accuracy before and after the attack, and record
the fooling rates for three different configurations of the 2s-
AGCN, i.e. joint only (Js-AGCN), bone only (Bs-AGCN) and
ensemble (2s-AGCN). The results in Table III show that the
perturbations generated with ST-GCN significantly degrades
the recognition performance of 2s-AGCN. This demonstrate
that the proposed CIASA attacker is able to generalize well
on ‘unseen’ action recognition models.
2) Cross-Modality Transferability: To transfer the pertur-
bations from skeleton to RGB space, we adopt a human pose
synthesis technique [51] to create RGB actions based on the
perturbed skeleton sequences generated with the advanced
mode of CIASA. The adopted synthesis pipeline can produce
realistic RGB actions with diversified human models, back-
grounds, cloth textures and illuminations. Moreover, the tem-
poral dynamics of the underlying action is also reproducible in
the synthesized RGB video. We demonstrate successful cross-
modality transferability in Fig. 5. The rows (a) and (d) are
the original and perturbed skeleton sequences respectively. (b)
and (e) show the RGB actions generated using [51] with (a)
and (d) used as the inputs skeleton sequences.
Firstly, the successful generation of realistic RGB videos in
(b) and (e) affirms that the skeleton perturbations generated
by CIASA are useful in producing action perturbations in
the Physical world beyond the skeleton space. Secondly,
we observe that the adversarial information remains largely
preserved during the cross-modality transfer. In Fig. 5, we use
VNect [26] as a 3D pose extractor to recover 3D skeletons
directly from the synthesized RGB actions. The recovered
skeleton sequences are then fed to the trained ST-GCN model
for action recognition, mimicking the typical pipeline for the
skeleton-based action recognition for RGB sensors.
The VNect-recovered 3D skeletons from clean and per-
turbed RGB data are respectively shown in rows (c) and (f) of
the figure. As can be seen, the recovered skeletons generally
follow the motion patterns encoded in the respective source
skeletons. For the clean data, the recovered skeletons in (c)
and the source skeletons in (a) are both correctly recognized as
‘Throw’ action. For the perturbed data, the recovered skeleton
sequence in (f) has fooled the ST-GCN into miscalssifying the
action as ‘Back pain’. Although the fooling is not in the exact
least likely class as in row (d), misclassifcation due to CIASA
attack for this very challenging scenario is still intriguing. We
note that the attack here is naturally degenerating into an un-
targeted attack.
To further scale up the cross-modality experiment, we ran-
domly select 240 skeleton actions for the cross-view protocol
of the NTU dataset. Then, we conduct the cross-modality
transfer for all those sequences. We only use a subset of the
NTU dataset because of the unreasonable computational time
required to render videos for the complete dataset. Subse-
quently, we predict action labels with ST-GCN on the VNect-
recovered skeleton sequences for both clean and perturbed
data. With this setting, the recognition accuracy is recorded
as 53.3% for the clean data, and 38.9% for the perturbed
data. Compared to the original NTU cross-view accuracy of
88.3% [8], lower performance is observed on the clean data
due to inaccurate 3D pose extraction by VNect. Nevertheless,
the proposed attack is still able to preserve its adversarial
characteristics to further cause a significant accuracy drop in
this challenging scenario.
E. Ablation Study
For the CIASA attack, we have proposed a set of spatio-
temporal constraints to achieve high-quality adversarial per-
turbations in terms of both temporal coherence and spatial
integrity of the perturbed skeletons. Here, we provide an
ablation study to compare the contributions of these constraints
in the overall results.
To enforce temporal smoothness in the perturbed skeleton
sequences, we penalize the joint accelerations between the
consecutive skeleton frames. Figure 6 compares the perturbed
skeletons with and without this temporal constrains in the
basic mode of CIASA, where the original and perturbed
skeletons are highlighted with green and red color respectively.
It is apparent that the perturbed skeletons in (b) move more
smoothly than those in (a) along the temporal dimension.
This ascertains the effectiveness of temporal smoothing in our
attack. Both perturbations in (a) and (b) successfully fool the
recognition model to miscalssify “Drink action” as the “Jump
up” action.
To enforce spatial integrity and anthropomorphic plausibil-
ity, we use spatial skeleton realignment (SSR) and GAN reg-
ularization. Such spatial constrains are particularly important
for the CIASA localized attacks, where only a given subset of
the joints is permitted to be changed. Figure 7 compares the
perturbation results with and without the spatial constraints
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Fig. 5. TOP: Clean data of different modalities. (a) Original skeleton sequences. (b) RGB video rendered from the original sequence. (c) Recovered 3D pose
sequence extracted from (b) using VNect [26]. BOTTOM: Perturbed data of different modalities. (d) Perturbed skeleton sequences created with the advanced
mode of CIASA. (e) RGB video rendered from (d). (f) 3D poses extracted from (e) using VNect [26].
for a localized attack on skeleton legs. Without any spatial
constrains, the perturbed skeletons in (a) shows unrealistic
pose configurations and arbitrary lengths of bones. With only
SSR enabled in (b), lengths of the perturbed bones are more
consistent with their original values, however, the resulting
poses are still not realistic in terms of plausibility. By adding
the GAN regularization, the skeletons in (c) are more realistic.
The skeleton sequences in the figure clearly demonstrates the
effectiveness of SSR and GAN regularization in our attack.
All sequences in Fig. 7 (a), (b) and (c) successfully fool the
recognition model in predicting the label “Drink water” as
“Jump up”.
VI. CONCLUSION
We present the first systematic adversarial attack on
skeleton-based action recognition. Unlike the existing attacks
that target non-sequential tasks, e.g. image classification, se-
mantic segmentation and pose estimation, we attack deep
sequential models from a spatio-temporal perspective. With
skeleton-based action recognition model ST-GCN [8] as the
target, we demonstrate its successful fooling by mainly per-
turbing the joint positions. The proposed attack algorithm
CIASA imposes spatio-temporal constraints on the adversarial
perturbations to produce perturbed skeleton sequences with
temporal smoothness, spatial integrity, and anthropomorphic
plausibility. The proposed algorithm works in different modes
based on the needs of the attack. With the localized mode
of CIASA, we are able to perturb only a particular set of
the body joints to launch localized attack. Such attacks can
be used to inject regional perturbations to pre-specified parts
of the body, without interfering with the dominant action
patterns that are performed by the other joints. Compared
to the basic mode that perturbs all the joints with global
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Fig. 6. Temporal smoothness in CIASA. (a) Perturbed skeleton sequence
without temporal smoothness constrains. (b) Perturbed sequence with temporal
smoothness constrains. The original and perturbed skeletons are shown in
Green and Red colors respectively.
Fig. 7. Effectiveness of spatial constraints in CIASA. A localized attack is
launched on two legs of the skeleton. (a) No spatial constraints: Pose config-
uration and bone lengths change randomly. (b) Spatial Skeleton Realignment
(SSR): Constrained consistent bone lengths, but unnatural poses. (c) GAN
regularization: Realistic poses that can correspond to the real-world skeleton
motions.
clipping, an advanced mode utilizes localized attacks with
hierarchical joint variations to disguises the attack intentions
with realistic motion patterns. Our experiments show that the
proposed CIASA perturbations generalize well across different
recognition models. Moreover, they also have the ability to
transfer to RGB video modality under graphics rendering
pipeline. This indicates that CIASA generated perturbations
can allow attackers to mimic semantically imperceptible ad-
versarial patterns in the real world to fool skeleton based action
recognition systems.
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